Abstract. We consider a model of two-candidate elections with a one-dimensional policy space. Spending on campaign advertisements can directly influence voters' preferences, and contributors give the money for campaign spending in exchange for promised services if the candidate wins. We find that the winner of the election depends crucially on the contributors' beliefs about who is likely to win, and the contribution market tends towards nonsymmetric equilibria in which one of the two candidates has no chance of winning. If the voters are only weakly influenced by advertising or if permissible campaign spending is small, then the candidates choose policies close to the median voter's ideal point, but the contributors still determine the winner. Uncertainty about the Condorcet-winning point (or its nonexistence) can change these results and generate equilibria in which both candidates have substantial probabilities of winning.
Introduction
As candidates compete for votes in an election campaign, they also compete for contributions to finance their campaigns. To develop a theory of elections, we need to understand the effects of both of these levels of competition, and the interactions between the two levels.
When candidates raise funds in return for promises of services after election, a candidate whom contributors expect to lose may be unable to raise funds. Thus the contributors' expectations may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, if campaign spending is needed to win. In such situations contributors' expectations can be a decisive exogenous factor in determining the winner of an election. In this paper we show that such equilibria can arise even in electoral situations where voters are only marginally influenced by campaign spending, if there is a known Condorcet winning position. Furthermore, we demonstrate that less extreme equilibria in which contributors expect two candidates to both have positive probabilities of winning (see for instance Baron 1989a ) maybe unstable. In such situations candidates may find that their most important activity is the manipulation of contributors' perceptions at the beginning of the campaign.
It is difficult to develop an intuitively reasonable and logically complete model of elections that integrates fund-raising competition with vote-getting competition (for a general survey of models of campaign contributions see Morton and Cameron (1991) and Austen-Smith (forthcoming)). Models with both types of competition generally have difficulty explaining how campaign expenditures affect voting decisions. Typically, campaign expenditures are assumed to play an informational role, signalling either the policy position of the candidates or non-policy qualities (like honesty) of the candidates.
However if campaign contributions are given in return for private services, as in Baron (1989a Baron ( ,b, 1991 , Baron and Mo (1993) , Hinich and Munger (1989) , and Snyder (1991) , then the signalling approach begs the question, should the primary message from campaign spending be that the candidate who spends the most has also sold the most promises to special-interest contributors? It is hard to imagine that voters would find
candidates that provide such favors attractive. If so, then campaign spending should be a negative signal that repels voters, and all candidates should spend nothing in equilibrium.
In our paper we simply assume that campaign spending has some positive effect on voters, which may be interpreted as due to an informational role or as a direct effect of advertising on voter preferences. We assume that campaign promises are inelastically supplied, so that all candidates are promising the same amount of private services if elected. Thus, as in Snyder (1991), differences in campaign funding among the candidates arise purely from differences in their perceived probability of winning the election.
The basic model
We consider an election with two candidates, whom we number 1 and 2. We suppose that there is a one-dimensional set of government policy options which are denoted by real numbers.
During the campaign, each candidate i first chooses a number x , which is the candidate's policy i position. We assume that the two candidates choose their policy positions simultaneously and independently. Then, after competitively raising campaign funds, each candidate i spends some amount s to buy campaign advertising, where s is a nonnegative number. , where is a given parameter (common to all voters) which is assumed to be greater than zero.
So voter h likes the outcome better when the winning candidate has advertised more, and when the winning candidate advocates a policy position that is closer to the voter's ideal point .
Notice that each voter's utility depends on the spending and the policy position of the winning candidate only.
That is, we allow that a voter's utility may depend directly on the advertisements that he has observed. Advertisements can give voters a sense of contact or familiarity with the candidates. We assume here that, other things being equal, a voter would prefer the election of a candidate with whom the voter has a greater sense of such contact or familiarity. Thus, a voter's utility for the outcome of an election may depend directly on the amount that the winning candidate has spent for campaign advertising, as well as on the winning candidate's substantive policy positions. Alternatively, we could justify the influence of campaign expenditures directly upon voter utility as serving an informational role such as discussed in the Introduction.
In rational-choice modeling, "rationality" is strictly interpreted as meaning that each agent acts consistently so as to maximize the expected value of some utility function. In this strict technical sense, there is nothing "irrational" about an assumption that voters' utility functions can be directly influenced by advertising. Nevertheless, we agree that there is something unappealing about such an assumption. We may be attributing a kind of vulgarity or bad taste to the voters,
and it would not be surprising if bad outcomes follow from assuming that agents have such bad taste. To answer such concerns, the utility dependence on campaign spending is expressed here only in a term that is multiplied by a parameter , and we will explicitly take * towards zero in our analysis. Our results then show that, even if the effect of advertising on voters' utilities is arbitrarily small, the competition for campaign financing may be crucial to determining the winner of the election.
We describe the large population of voters by a measure space, and we assume that voters' ideal points are distributed over some interval. In this section, we assume that this distribution has positive density over some interval, and its median is M. That is, M denotes the median voter's ideal point, and this number M is assumed here to be common knowledge among all candidates and campaign contributors. (In Section 4, we will consider the case where candidates and campaign contributors may be uncertain about the location of the median voter's ideal point.)
After the campaign, when the policy positions (x , x ) and the levels of campaign spending 1 2 (s , s ) are known by all voters, the election is held, and each voter votes for a candidate. The 1 2 winner of the election will be the candidate who gets the most votes (i.e., who gets votes from the larger measure of voters). So each voter should vote for his preferred candidate, because doing otherwise would be a dominated strategy for the voter.
Given the positions (x , x ) and the campaign spending levels (s , s ), a voter with ideal 1 2 1 2 point would vote for candidate 1 only if
If x x , then this inequality is algebraically equivalent to
Thus, the number divides the set of voters' ideal points into two sets. The voters whose ideal points are less than (x , x , s , s ) will vote for the candidate who has chosen the lower policy position x , while the 1 2 1 2 i voters whose ideal points are greater than (x , x , s , s ) will vote for the candidate who has between the two candidates, and would be willing to randomly vote for either candidate. (We assume here that there are no costs of voting.) The majority block is the side that includes the median point M. Thus, candidate 1 will win if
Candidate 2 will win if
On the other hand, if
then we should expect a close race in which either candidate may win.
In this section, we assume that each candidate's campaign spending is exactly equal to the amount of money that he raises from contributors. We assume that candidates are constrained to meet pre-election commitments; Baron (1989b) argues that actual campaign expenditures might be loans paid off by contributors once favors are delivered. Following Snyder (1990) , we assume that the winning candidate will be able to offer a stock of political services that are worth a total present-discounted value W to their recipients. To raise funds for the campaign, each candidate sells his promises of these services in 2 a competitive market, where contributors buy them as investment goods. So let p denote the 3 i perceived probability that candidate i will win the election, as assessed at the point in time when the candidates are selling their promised services to raise campaign funds. Then each candidate i will raise funds equal to Wp , and so the campaign spending by candidate i will be
Of course, p = 1 -p in this two-candidate race, so we may express each candidate's campaign 2 1 spending in terms of candidate 1's probability of winning: 
for each pair of policy positions (x , x ).
1 2
Let us now add the assumption that contributors have rational expectations about the outcome of the election when they buy their service promises from the candidates. Then, for any pair of policy positions (x , x ), candidate 1's win probability p (x , x ) must satisfy the following 1 2 1 1 2 conditions:
1 1 2
then the race is expected to be close, and the contributor's perceived probability of candidate 1 winning p (x , x ) could be any number between 0 and 1.
We assume that each candidate chooses his position so as to maximize his probability of winning. That is, candidate 1 wants to maximize p , and candidate 2 wants to minimize p (that 1 1 is, to maximize p = 1 -p ). So in a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium, the candidates must choose
can satisfy conditions (2)- (4) - 
so that the hypotheses of both conditions (3) and (4) are not satisfied. This equation is equivalent
and .
So there is a solution in which 0 < p (x , x ) < 1 (making 2p (x , x ) -1 between -1 and 1) if
and only if
Thus, there are three cases to consider, in a subgame after the candidates have chosen positions x and x . If
then the only possibility is that candidate 2 is expected to win for sure (that is, p (x , x ) = 0). If 
10 then the only possibility is that candidate 1 is expected to win for sure (p (x , x ) = 1). To 1 1 2 summarize, we have proven the following theorem. 4 Theorem 1. In any equilibrium, for any pair of candidates' positions (x , x ), candidate 1's 1 2 conditional probability of winning given these positions must be either p (x , x ) = 1 or
Any one of these three equations can hold if the quantity
is between -W and W. If this quantity is greater than W, however, then p (x , x ) must equal 1 1 2 0. If this quantity is less than -W then p (x , x ) must equal 1.
The multiplicity of solutions in the case where condition (7) applies give us multiple equilibria in the first stage where the candidates choose their policy positions. The set of all possible equilibrium outcomes is easy to characterize, however. In fact, we can now prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. There exists an equilibrium in which a candidate chooses the position and then has a positive probability of winning the election if and only if
In an equilibrium where both candidates choose positions that satisfy these inequalities, candidate 1's probability of winning may be 1 or 0 or .
Proof. Notice first that a candidate i who wins with positive probability in equilibrium cannot be expected to choose a position that is outside the interval we can construct a function such that together form an equilibrium satisfying (2) -(5). If then no value of x can make the quantity (8), and the equilibrium condition (5) will be satisfied. To complete the construction, the function p (x , x ) 1 1 2
can be defined at all other points (where both and ) in any way allowed by our subgame rationality conditions (3) and (4). Q.E.D.
The essential idea behind this result is as follows: When both candidates choose policy positions that are within of the median point M, then either candidate could win if he got all the campaign contributions. Thus, the contributors are essentially in a coordination game.
Each contributor wants to contribute to the candidate to whom all the other contributors are giving, because no one wants to pay for promises from a loser, and a candidate will lose if no one contributes to his campaign. Such coordination games have multiple equilibria, and the candidates' positions can influence the selection of the focal equilibrium that the contributors realize, in the subgame after the candidate's positions are announced. In the above construction, if one candidate i has deviated from his expected position but the other candidate has not, then
x 1 13 the contributors focus on the equilibrium in which candidate i is perceived as a sure loser and therefore cannot raise any campaign funds.
The probability function is discontinuous in the above construction, but this property is unavoidable, because there is no way to construct a function that satisfies
conditions (3) and (4) In the case where condition (7) Proof. If the theorem were false, then there would exist an interval such that is in the the contributors' perceptions must be of primary concern to the candidates, in any equilibrium.
The strong conclusions of Theorem 3 may be modified somewhat if we admit the possibility that the contributors' beliefs may also depend on some random variable, which we may call the momentum factor, that is publicly observed only after the candidates choose their policy positions. Rational expectations still implies that, after the contributors get all their information about the policy positions and the momentum factor, they must believe either that p is 1, or that 1 p is 0, or that p is the intermediate value described in Theorem 1. However, the possibility that support such an equilibrium, however, the probability of the p = 0 beliefs must be positive and 1 increasing whenever candidate 1 unilaterally deviates from , and the probability of the p = 1 1 beliefs must also be positive and increasing whenever candidate 2 unilaterally deviates from .
That is, there must be at least a significant possibility that deviations from his predicted campaign position may turn the momentum factor decisively against a candidate in the eyes of his contributors.
The parameter represents the degree to which voters are impressionable or manipulable The effects of decreasing W, the value of offered services, are the same as the effects of decreasing , because W appears in our analysis only multiplied by . So decreasing the value of services that the winner can offer to contributors forces the candidates to take positions in a narrower interval around the median voter's ideal point. After the candidates have both located in this narrower interval, however, the contributors' perceptions remain the crucial decisive factor in determining who wins the election.
Our model can offer a simple explanation of incumbency advantages. We only need to add the assumption that the contributors always act according to a focal equilibrium in which the incumbent's probability of winning is 1 whenever he picks a policy position that is close enough to the median voter's ideal point (i.e., between and . In our model, the contributors' beliefs that the incumbent will win can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
3. Limits on campaign spending
The above model can be easily extended to consider the effect of legal upper bounds on campaign spending. Notice first that campaign spending affects voters' decisions only through the difference between the utility effects of the candidates' campaign advertising, which is s -s . In the basic model above, condition (1) implied that this utility difference could be 1 2 related to the perceived probability p through the simple formula 1 . Now, to introduce a legal maximum on campaign spending, let B denote the maximum amount that each candidate is allowed to spend on campaign advertising, where B is between 0 and W. Then condition (1) in Section 2 must be rewritten as follows:
Thus, the relationship between the utility difference s -s and candidate 1's perceived 1 2 probability of winning now becomes
As p increases from 0 to 1, this utility difference increases from to . To achieve a 1 utility difference from advertising that equals , which is necessary for an intermediate solution in which both candidates have a positive probability of winning, p must now satisfy the equation
Thus, the following generalization of Theorem 2 can be proven by a straightforward extension of the arguments in Section 2.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the upper bound B on campaign spending satisfies 0 < B < W.
Then there exists an equilibrium in which a candidate chooses the position x and then has a i positive probability of winning the election if and only if .
In any equilibrium, after the candidates choose positions (x , x ) that both satisfy these 1 2 inequalities, one of the following three conditions must hold:
So the effect of a bound on campaign spending is very similar to the effect of a decrease in W, in that both force the candidates to take positions closer to the median voters' ideal point, but both still permit multiple equilibria in which contributor's beliefs can decisively determine the winner of the election. Only the intermediate (0 < p < 1) solution is somewhat changed.
1 However, the same argument used to prove Theorem 3 can also be applied here to show that the intermediate solutions are unstable, in that they reward a candidate for moving farther from the median voter's ideal point. Once the candidates' policy positions (x , x ) and levels of campaign spending (s , s ) are 1 2 1 2 specified, the voting preferences of a voter with any ideal point can be determined as in Section 2. In particular, a voter with ideal point would be indifferent between voting for The number that solves this equation (10) Thus, the indifference-point equation (10) is
Solving this equation for p in terms of gives us
This equation tells us what the contributors to the candidates' campaign funds must believe about the probability of candidate 1 winning, if the difference in the two candidates' campaign spending is to be such that a voter with ideal point would be indifferent between the two candidates.
So in any rational-expectations equilibrium, given the candidates' positions x and x , the 1 2 win probability p and the indifference point must together satisfy conditions (11ab) and (12).
1
For now, let us consider the case where x < x , so (11a) and (12) are the conditions for a rational 1 2 expectations equilibrium.
Theorem 5. Suppose that we are given candidate positions x and x such that x < x . Then the conditions (11a) and (12) for a rational-expectations equilibrium have at least one solution and have at most three solutions. If there are three solutions, then there is at least one solution such that and p > 0.5, and there is at least one other solution such that
The right-hand side of this equation is an increasing linear function of , with a range of values that covers the whole set of real numbers, but the left-hand side is an increasing continuously differentiable function of that is bounded between 0 and 1. Thus, these two functions of must be equal for at least one value of .
Between any two solutions, there must exist a value of where the slope of is equal to (which is the slope of the linear function of on the right-hand side of (13) above). There cannot be more than two such values of , because the slope of increases monotonically from 0 to as increases from -up to , and the slope of decreases monotonically back down to 0 as increases from to + . Thus, there cannot be more than three solutions.
Notice that the right-hand side of (13) can be rewritten
The first inequality in Theorem 4 implies that, when , the right-hand side of (13) is less than 0.9772 = . But as goes to + , the left-hand side of (13) goes to 1 while the right-hand side goes to + , so there must exist a solution in which and p > 1 0.9772. The second inequality implies that, when , the right-hand side of (13) is greater than = 0.0228. But as goes to -, the right-hand side of (13) goes to 0 while the left-hand side goes to -, so there must exist another solution in which and p < 0.0228. Finally, because the difference between the two sides of (13) Thus, when the two candidates choose positions that are close together, we find three very different rational-expectations equilibria, just as in Section 2. If the difference in the candidate's policy positions is small, then small differences in campaign spending can influence many voters, and a belief among contributors that some candidate is much more likely to win can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because of the uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point, however, each candidate must always have some positive probability of winning, even in the equilibrium where the campaign contributions are heavily favoring his opponent.
As in Section 2, the multiplicity of equilibria after policy positions are chosen gives us a multiplicity of equilibria in the first stage, when the candidates independently choose their policy 
at the first stage of this scenario, candidate 2 should locate at x = . If candidate 1 chose a 2 position x that was also very close to , then the right-hand side of equation (12) To find the optimal position for candidate 1 in this scenario, we differentiate equations (11a) and (12) To tabulate these solutions, it is helpful to transform our variables. Let us define
, and z = . 
where denotes the cumulative distribution for the standard normal distribution that has mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Solutions to (14) are shown in Table 1 for selected values of the parameter . Notice that this crucial parameter is the ratio of , which measures
" µ 28 uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point, and , which measures the possible distance of equilibrium outcomes from the median voter's ideal point when this point is known.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] When is substantially larger than 1, then the contributors' uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point is large, and so they assess a substantial probability that the median voter's ideal point may be far from x , in the same direction as x is from x . In this event, the median voter 2 1 2
would care strongly about even small policy changes towards his ideal point, and so he might not be swayed from voting for candidate 1 even if candidate 2 got almost all the money for campaigning. Thus, when is large, candidate 1 can guarantee himself a substantial probability of winning in any rational expectations equilibrium, by choosing a policy position different from x 2 but close to .
On the other hand, if is close to 0, then the contributors' uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point is small. In this case, as in Section 2, contributors' perceptual biases against either candidate can sustain a rational expectations equilibrium in which this candidate has a very small chance of winning. The rightmost column in Table 1 shows that, as becomes small, the distance between and the optimal position for candidate 1 in this worst-case equilibrium approaches the bound that we found in Section 2.
Given any value of , if candidate 2's position were known to be anything other than , then candidate 1 could still guarantee himself a worst-case probability of winning that is not less µ 29 than the number in the p column of Table 1 , by locating z standard deviations from on the 1 1 side away from x . Thus, the equilibria that are summarized in Table 1 are the worst for   2 candidate 1 among all the pure-strategy rational-expectations equilibria of this model.
Conclusions
For elections involving two candidates and a one-dimensional policy space, theorists since Hotelling [1929] have observed that the candidates have strong incentives to both pick policy positions that are very close to the ideal point of the median voter. This policy convergence result in the Hotelling model should lead us to expect that other non-policy variables may assume crucial roles in determining which of these two policy-similar candidates will actually win the election. In this paper, we have found that such closeness of policy positions may cause campaign spending on image advertising, and the contributions that fund this campaign spending, to become the decisive factors that determine who wins the election. This result can hold even if such campaign spending has only a weak effect on voters' preferences.
We have also shown that, when contributions from service-motivated contributors are so decisive, the market for campaign contributions may tend towards extreme equilibria in which contributors overwhelmingly favor one candidate over the other. Which candidate will be so favored is then a question of selection among multiple equilibria, which must be understood in terms of Schelling's [1960] focal-point effect. That is, the winner of the election may be determined primarily by some environmental factor (such as incumbency, or lead in an early poll) that can lead the contributors to focus on a self-fulfilling prophecy that one particular candidate will win. Thus, a candidates' most important political activity may be his manipulation of contributors' beliefs by such focal factors, at the beginning of the campaign.
These conclusions depend on the assumption that there exists a known policy position (the median voter's ideal point) that could beat any other position if there were no campaign advertising, and which thus strongly attracts the candidates to choose similar policy positions. In Section 4, we found that uncertainty about the median voter's ideal point can reduce the importance of contributors' perceptions, and can thus also reduce the importance of focal factors like incumbency which affect the contributors' perceptions. With such uncertainty, for any policy position that one candidate might take, the other candidate can find another position such that, with substantial probability, a majority of voters may prefer the latter position strongly enough to vote for it even when the first candidate greatly outspends the second. Similar effects may be expected in multidimensional policy spaces where a Condorcet-winning policy position does not exist. Analysis of the multidimensional case would require consideration of randomized-strategy equilibria, however, which would greatly complicate our analysis. market, and the median voter's ideal point is a normally distributed random variable with mean and standard deviation .
1. That is, to the extent that favors are rivalrous and affect other contributing interest groups the assumption is that the effects are widespread and not significant enough to induce a response from a particular group or voters. One may argue that voters' utility may be decreasing in the size of the sum of such favors as noted above in our discussion of the signalling approach; such an assumption would simply lower the size of delta in our model.
2. In Baron (1989a,b) candidates are unconstrained a priori in the amount of services they can offer but instead receive disutility from providing services and thus the value from winning declines as the amount of services provided increases.
3. The implied assumption is that the competition in providing "favors" across many elections is such that the demand curve for each candidate for "favors" is perfectly elastic. However, as Morton and Cameron (1992) note, if candidates have monopoly power over the provision of favors once elected then the competition within an electoral contest for contributions might lead to zero campaign contributions in equilibrium unless there is a constraint on the supply of potential services. We assume that the supply is constrained by W.
4. When equation (8) holds, the median voter is randomizing between the two candidates with probabilities which are not necessarily .50-.50. Equation (8) is derived from the condition of making the median voter indifferent between the two candidates, in which case he or she should be willing to randomize between the two candidates in any arbitrary way. It is well known in game theory that existence of equilibria may require randomization in probabilities which are not necessarily .50-.50. To interpret such randomized equilibria, we do not need to assume that anyone actually tosses an unfair coin. Following Harsanyi (1973) , we may interpret the randomized behavior of the median voter as depending on information that is unavailable to the other players. (See also Myerson 1991, pp. 129-131.) This interpretation is developed in Section 4 of this paper, where we admit uncertainty about the ideal point of the median voter. Then the median voter's decision depends only on his true ideal point, and not any coin toss; but the limit of these equilibria in Section 4, as the uncertainty goes to zero, is just the equilibrium behavior described here in Theorem 1.
5. Such uncertainty may result if we assume as in Ledyard (1984) that voters may rationally abstain and that candidates are uncertain about the costs of voting.
